Called ‘the father of modern philosopher, Rene Descartes was a French philosopher, mathematician, scientist and writer.
In 'Talking to Pharaohs', Descartes
talks about our own, personal reality as epitomised by, for example, the things we see: colours and shapes. He goes on to talk about the poverty of language and our inability to define certain things like love.RLF: Philosophers have said that the term qualia (singular – quale)refers to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. So that seeing a colour, for instance, possesses qualia. Let’s think about colours and ask ourselves if they are real – for everybody; and if they are real, are they the same for everybody with 20-20 vision.
AN: That would be impossible to ascertain, wouldn’t it?
RLF: I think it would, but we could use conjecture to try to work out the truth of the statement: that colours are not necessarily the same for each person with perfect eyesight.
AN: If I say that grass is green, how can you argue against it? What can you say but agree?
RLF: On the face of it, you are right, but think about it – how do you know that your green is the same as mine?
AN: Because we both agree that grass is the colour we call green.
RLF: There, you’ve hit the nail upon the head.
AN: Have I?
RLF: Yes, just because we say it’s green – the colour of grass, doesn’t mean we see the same colour.
AN: I can’t see that, surely if we have both identified it, it is the same colour.
RLF: Not necessarily. What we identify as the colour green is merely that which reflects light on the same frequency, so that the colour we both agree to call green, is nothing more that a reflection of light waves that is the same for both of us.
AN: And if it is the same, then isn’t it going to be the same colour that we both see?
RLF: What happens to the light emitted from the colour green, after it enters our retina – after we see it?
AN: We identify it as the colour green, do we not?
RLF: Yes, we do, but who or what tells us that?
AN: Our eyesight, linked to our brain by the optical nerve.
RLF: Exactly, so it is the brain that is the identifier – the eye merely receives the image. And it is the brain that tells us what to call it, is it not?
AN: Yes, what’s your point?
RLF: That if your brain tells you to say green, as far as you can tell, that is what it is, and the same goes for me, but, and here I need you to pause before you answer; the two colours we are stimulated to say are both green may not be the same colours we imagine we see. You have no way of telling me what green is or feels like when you see it, and neither have I.
If we can differ on something as fundamental as identifying a common thing like the colour green, then do you not think it is possible to disagree – that might be the wrong word – differ is better; it does not imply right or wrong, rather difference.
AN: I see, and I think I agree with you. What about the shapes of things? Do we see different shapes?
RLF: I think not; shapes have edges, which we can define, point to and describe – we can use our hands to imitate shapes, but not colours, and not feelings either.
Who can say with any certainty that what you feel as pleasure is what I feel; let us start with something simple, like the taste of something sweet, or warm. all we can agree on is that both feel nice: sweetness and warmth, but that too much of either stops being pleasant, and in the case of heat, becomes painful.
We have different tolerance levels for pain, and, presumably for how sweet we can bear something to be. One hurts us, the other merely makes us feel sick, or at least too much sweetness does.
AN: That still doesn’t get us very far, does it?
RLF: No, it doesn’t. We are still unable – language is unable to describe what is felt when tasting sugar, or when feeling warmth. All we can do is say that it is sweet or warm, but little more. Our language will allow us to compare it with something else that is sweet, or with something else that is warm, but that is still a long way from saying what it feels like.
AN: Language lacks a lot then, doesn’t it?
RLF: It does. It is almost as if language intervenes to let us off the hook, as it were; it keeps us from describing our experiences accurately, or in ways that would be intelligible to others.
AN: And so in that respect, we are still in the stage we were when building the Tower of Babel; we cannot make ourselves understood in so many ways.
RLF: And so what we do is offer explanations that have the word ‘like’ in them. So the question, ‘What does sugar taste like?’ getting the answer, ‘It’s sweet.’ does nothing, or would convey nothing to someone who had never had the sense of taste.
In fact, we can barely frame a question that does not elicit the word ‘like’ in the reply. What is sugar? – that does not ask a question about what the taste of sugar; How is sugar? is almost nonsensical to us. We are left with, ‘What does X taste like? - to which we reply ‘It tastes like Y.’ - where Y is a recognizable other thing.
So all we do is compare, thinking we are describing. Poetry can often intervene, but it does so only in ways we can culturally agree upon. Telling someone who has never drunk wine that white is drier than red would make no sense; we first have to start from the same place.
Robert L. Fielding

























